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Legal Scholarship and Legal Education
Abstract

Legal scholarship must be related to legal education, so that teaching does not reflect only one aspect of legal
training, whether it be black-letter law, clinical training, or feeble attempts to graft on bits of other disciplines.
Instead, students must be exposed to a true synthesis of law and other disciplines and areas of learning. This
will require a serious reconsideration of teaching methods, preparation of teaching materials, and ways of
testing law students. Academic law should not be merely reflexive. Some attempt must be made, if possible, to
avoid the intellectual lag of the law. It may be necessary to develop different streams of legal education - with a
cultural intellectual degree and an intensive technocratic qualification.
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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND
LEGAL EDUCATION
By

GRAHAM PARKER

Legal scholarship must be related to legal education, so that teachingdoes not reflect

only one aspect of legal training, whether it be black-letter law, clinical training,
orfeeble attempts to graft on bits of other disciplines.Insteatl students must be exposed

to a true synthesis of law and other disciplinesand areasof learning.This will require
a serious reconsiderationof teachingmethods, preparationof teachingmaterials,and
ways of testing law students. Academic law should not be merely reflexive Some

attempt must be made, if possible, to avoid the intellectual lag of the law. It may
be necessary to develop different streams of legal education intellectual degree and an intensive technocraticqualification.

with a cultural

My premise is that legal scholarship cannot exist in a vacuum but
must be related to legal education. Law professors teach a shallow form
of legal reasoning because their discipline is mechanistic, non-intellectual,
and derivative.
If I were a teacher of English literature and a Blake scholar, I would
devote my scholarly energies to editing his correspondence, immersing
myself in the social and political culture of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century or, perhaps, exploring the religious beliefs of Blake
and his contemporaries. If I taught Canadian history, I would be engaged
in research on the Family Compact, the Selkirk settlement, the political
beliefs of the Loyalists, the political life of Laurier, the economic history
of prairie farming or the history of the Bering Sea dispute. If I were
teaching physics, I would be engaged in research based on fundamental
principles and attempts to test those principles and push back the frontiers
of scientific thought. Of course, I may be of a philosophic bent and
then I might be immersed in the philosophy of literary criticism, or of
historical or scientific enquiry.
I have the distinct impression that all law professors who want to
be known as scholars are concentrating on the 'philosophy of law' or,
more accurately, political and social theory. Yet this is the sticking point
because, as they think about the philosophy of law, they are driven to
o Copyright, 1985, Graham Parker.
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Postscript. There are no footnotes. The sources mentioned should be clear to anyone even vaguely
familiar with the field. In any event, this comment is typically legal-argumentative, antiintellectual, non-synthetic and superficial.
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the realization that the law is only a secondary discipline and there is
little 'pure' theory in the law, only 'applied' theory. In other words, when
law scholars start an examination of Law, even in its 'purest' form, they
discover that there are real problems in trying to describe legal reasoning.
An engineer, in describing the problem of building a bridge across a
river, does not give much thought to the fundamental laws of physics.
Instead, careful thought is given to the logistical problems of having
the materials on site in the correct time sequence, to the peculiar geological
and climatic problems of the particular site, and to zoning, environmental,
and labour problems. The 'theory' behind the bridge being a feasible
structure is a given. Surely, the lawyer, who must predict the outcome,
is in somewhat the same situation. Despite having very interesting theories
about how society should function, the lawyer is stuck with the present
structure of the courts, the political realities of judicial appointments,
the length of the client's purse (and that of the opposing side) and the
psychological dimensions of the tactics that must be used. Although
wanting to create a better world, the lawyer is no more free to do so
than the engineer or the architect. Perhaps the lawyer could go off to
the wilderness and build a Utopian state in the way that Frank Lloyd
Wright envisaged ideal architectural environments. The lawyer would
then become a philosopher but cease to be a lawyer. The same is true
of the physician. The study of medicine is based on 'pure' theory but
neither the medical student nor the physician pay much attention to the
principles of biology or chemistry when trying to study the liver or to
cure a disease of the liver. Of course, it is not altogether appropriate
to compare law and legal study with the physical sciences. One could
describe law as a social science, although I would prefer to call it an
art with a background of history, philosophy, and economics.
One of the most surprising aspects of the open discussion at the
Symposium was the lack of attention paid to legal education. One hardly
needs another essay on the law teacher as a person having schizophrenic
tendencies. William Twining has eloquently described the dichotomy of
Pericles and the Plumber.
Some questions about law teaching have relevance to legal
scholarship:
1) Who are the most popular teachers, at least according to student
evaluations?
I can only speak of Osgoode but my assessment is that the 'best'
teachers are those who teach black letter law subjects. I don't think
it is merely because they teach in a black letter fashion. The subjects
are doctrinal and these same teachers are often prolific writers of good
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doctrinal work. Why do the students like them? Because they perceive
that these teachers are giving them information about the 'real' law.
I don't think the teachers give the impression that this is the only way
to perceive the law. Imagine a student confronted with two teachers
presenting the same subject; let's say the course is mortgage law. One
writes clearly and prolifically about mortgage law, teaches the course
'straight' with a formulation that is crystal clear in its statement of the
principles of law. The other teacher wants to acquaint the students with
the economics of the real estate market, the political theories of Henry
George, Marxist theory of surplus value, and the sociology of urban
planning. If one asked the students their preference, they would undoubtedly opt for the first teacher even if both teachers had an equal grasp
of their subject and were equally proficient in expressing their ideas.
The students have a thirst for black letter law and do not want to be
confronted with ambiguity and theory. If the 'scholars' are on the side
of the angels, what can be done to convert students to scholarly pursuits
and divest them from crass professionalism?
2)

Why is it that, if you look at the examinations of the second type
of teacher, you will discover that only infrequently do policy issues
appear in the examination questions?

What is the use of scholarship if it is not used in testing the students'
understanding of the social and political problems of, for example, the
law of mortgages? One could take the attitude that the 'radical' scholarly
teachers who set very 'straight' examinations are being pedagogically
responsible in that they are not preaching their own views but are testing
the students on professional skills. This surely is evasive. 'Scholarly'
teachers must integrate their scholarly interests with the subjects they
teach. The scholarly bits cannot just be stuck on afterwards in fancy
little seminar courses called "The Law And Something or Other." Of
course, we might alleviate the problem if the law schools had mandatory
pre-law courses that provided intellectual background rather than a mishmash of courses resulting in B+ grades to appease the Admissions
Committee.
3) If law teachers want to pursue and encourage scholarship, why do
they persist with 100 per cent examinations?
It strikes me as fairly useless or at least plainly inconsistent for
legal scholars to complain about lack of scholarship when they are not
encouraging law students to write a set of mid-term essays on topics
that are related to the course but not narrowly wedded to black letter
regurgitation. Many of my friends in the Arts faculties tell me that their
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research helps their teaching. I would think there is a corollary argument
that students may gain new insights into black letter law by being forced
to stretch their legal minds with some lateral thinking when they are
obliged to prepare an essay that is only peripherally related to the core
subject but nevertheless clearly related. I have always believed that the
best form of learning is oblique learning when you don't actually realize
that you are learning. This is well illustrated by John White's Legal
Imagination and yet this 'casebook' has been ignored in favour of more
outr6 offerings such as literary criticism and critical theory.
4) If legal scholars are dissatisfied with the present quality of scholarship,
why is there a tendency to inflate grades and reward pedestrian,
parrot-like regurgitation of third-rate rationalization known as legal
reasoning?
I suggest that the C+/B- range of examination paper, when graded
as adequate or on the top range of average, is over-rewarded when it
does little more than regurgitate, more or less accurately, what was stated
in class or in the casebook. How often do we say to students: "There
will be clear rewards for students who make it obvious that they have
done extra-curricular reading or thinking"? How often do we put our
words into practice? Surely, this would not happen as often in English
or History. Those examiners frown upon the 'Coles Notes approach' and
yet we seem to reward such behaviour.
5) Why do law schools persist with the case method or, in some cases,
the lecture method?
Is this due to laziness similar to the preoccupation with 100 per
cent final examinations? The teachers complain about the lock-step
mentality that seems to grip the first year student body, yet we seem
to persist in unimaginative and inappropriate teaching methods. Indeed,
we encourage them and it is aggravated by the use of a compulsory
first year moot that, once again, emphasizes the use of appellate cases.
Why is problem-solving so infrequently used in law school? If we
as teachers had to formulate problems for every day use, we might vastly
improve our classes. I think we could change students' minds about legal
education and their expectation of law practice if we simply taught them
to be good diagnosticians, and yet we do very little of this. I can remember
from my days in a law office that a client does not walk into the office
and say, "Hi, I'm Donoghue v. Stevenson." Yet, I was taught to expect
this because the law school curriculum has a compartmentalizing effect.
The client does not identify herself as footnote six on page 982 of the
casebook. We have failed the students except the 'elite' who are totally
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immersed in some abstract problem in corporate tax and can legitimately
ask for more and more black letter law. I am arguing for' a proper
integration of the law into workable and feasible curricular offerings.
Instead, we are left with little gobs of law data that are not useful. I
am not arguing in favour of a trade school. I may be arguing in favour
of good diagnostics, but surely that is different. Some of the most skilled
lawyers I know are not possessed of the superficiality of the hype artist
with the glib answer. They are those who have a firm grasp of a total
problem and can diagnose the most crucial issues and can orchestrate
the best strategies. Doesn't law foster the quick study?
Have you noticed that when a new law school or a new law school
curriculum tries to introduce students to a different approach to first
year (such as concentrating on such concepts as 'rights', 'possession',
'responsibility') rather than conventional subject groups, they always fall
flat? Is it because the law teacher simply lacks the expertise to integrate
and synthesize? I know these skills are very tricky and would require
a broad knowledge of surrounding disciplines and their relationship with
legal matters. I always find the first year criminal law course very difficult
because appellate case law is so two-dimensional. The course should
include data (in a particular case) on the rules and theory of evidence
and procedure. I would like to show the class a film depicting the makeup of the jury, the judge's biased attitude, the prosecutor's fair or vindictive
attitude, and the ineptitude of the defence counsel. To make it perfect,
we should also have a film consisting of interviews with the client, the
attempted plea bargaining session, the choice of the jury, a biography
of the judge, and psychological profiles of the accused, the defence lawyer,
and the prosecutor. There should be material on the social, theological,
philosophical, and psychological aspects of punishment, responsibility,
and guilt. These factors would convince anyone that the law is still an
art rather than a science and cannot be reduced to ideology and discussions
about hierarchical hegemonies. Very useful insights were produced by
the Realists who gave a new dimension to Facts and Rules. The Wisconsin
school pioneered historical studies of the law of contract and tort showing
that the concentration on appellate law gave a very false impression
of the law. In particular, James Willard Hurst showed that the legislative
process and statute law deserve treatment equal to that accorded to
common law.
The present fad in what is called, rightly or wrongly, legal scholarship
is a sterile and ideological concentration on political and social theory.
It is reminiscent of the preoccupation of sociology, twenty years ago,
with value-free research. This should not surprise us because legal
academics are usually a generation behind in their adoption of fads since
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law is a reflexive sub-discipline. The analogy to social science is also
unfortunately obvious in the faddists' addiction to impenetrable jargon
masquerading as erudition but, in fact, fostering confusion and obfuscation.
This criticism is applicable to both the vaguely left critical legal scholars
and the more conservative Chicago school law-and-economics enthusiasts. These new ideologies suffer from the same disability as the
philosophical radicals (particularly Jeremy Bentham); they lack a sense
of history and they largely ignore the real motivations of human
psychology.
Some of the critical legal scholars started out with very legitimate
criticisms of legal education and yet seem to have lost sight of these
concerns in favour of macro solutions and Big Ideas and Grand Theory.
The engineer has forgotten about building the bridge and, instead, is
heavily engrossed in the philosophy of transport. How can we reconcile
the need for some rigorous scholarship with the need to prepare students
for a responsible, thoughtful, and ethical professional life? What are the
solutions to this problem? One would be the divorce of scholarly pursuits
from legal education. There could be a school of law and a school of
jurisprudence. If the latter simply meant a research institute, then the
prognosis for success is not bright. One only has to consider the institute
at Johns Hopkins University in the 1930s or the Department of Law
at the Institute of Advanced Study at Australian National University.
Those examples show that a few 'legal' scholars congregated together
will not produce a great corpus of work but will simply follow their
own intellectual pursuits and, if we were fortunate, we would see good
scholarly work in philosophy, history, or sociology. If we were less blessed,
the scholarship would consist of simply more and more black letter law.
An alternative would be a degree in jurisprudence for those who
did not want to be mere plumbers and indeed, had no inclination to
practise law. Law teachers have not yet shown signs of the will or the
intellectual preparation required to construct such a curriculum or find
the people to teach it.
There is a second dilemma. An argument could be made that, because
law is more an art than a science, the law school curriculum should
consist mostly of liberal arts/law subjects that have as much law content
as thought desirable. We could adopt the view that the best lawyer would
be the student who is classically trained or has total immersion in legal
philosophy, legal history et cetera. This idea is probably a very good
one, but there are two problems with it. First, the faculty presently available is woefully undereducated; second, the students are convinced that
they need coverage - the more cases the better and the more data
the better. This may be nonsense for the single practitioner or even the

1985]

Legal Scholarship and Legal Education

general practitioner in a large firm, but it is probably true of the corporate
tax whizzbang who wants to sit in the back rooms of some law factory
and devise schemes so that millionaires or large corporations are immune
from paying tax and from governmental interference. Sometimes, I feel
that the law school really exists to produce these super legal technocrats.
The generalist who does not want to know by rote 1000 sections of
the tax statute, but wants to be a well-rounded perceptive practitioner,
is forgotten.
6)

Why is it almost impossible for law teachers to give serious scholarly
thought to legal education?

This may sound provocative; it is not meant to be. I suppose my
basic problem is that I do not believe in radical macro solutions to anything.
I find that such solutions are revolutionary and by definition one ends
up in the starting place. I happen to believe in micro solutions and yet
law teachers seem most reluctant to aim at relative success by accretion.
For instance, law teachers have spoken over the years about the need
for interdisciplinary studies. I have serious doubts about such an enterprise
if it means setting up elaborate research institutes. There is very clear
evidence that such projects have been a disaster. On the other hand,
one law professor working with one psychologist, statistician, historian,
or economist can have a useful partnership on a specific problem of
mutual interest. Why not start with a very practical problem? Why not
examine admission procedures and, in particular, the efficacy and
adequacy of the Law School Admission Test? Surely this would tell us
a lot about the nature of legal reasoning or the perceptions of law students.
Why not have a study that examines, with the help of an education
expert or a psychologist, the best methods of imparting basic routine
knowledge to first year students and the best methods of evaluation?
This seems so much more sensible than these macro approaches that
make pontifical statements about the need for radical change but end
up as discussions about political theory. Why not start being scholarly
about something we know rather than picking up some faddish ideas
that have already been exhaustively examined by the other disciplines?
(The whole question of the Law as Lag must be addressed. The study
of law is only a derivative discipline. The law is always referring to
another field of study - economics, psychology, or the philosophy of
something or other. To use an analogy, if one is training a student to
be a general medical practitioner, it will be necessary for that student
to learn about the nervous system, blood circulation, and the nature of
cellular structure. It will also be necessary to become observant of bodily
appearance, understand a patient's state of mind, and have some inkling
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of professional ethics. It is not part of medical education to devote most
time and mental energy to philosophical investigations about bioethics,
the implications of DNA, or the meaning of life although, of course,
these must be addressed.)
The legal scholar will not make great intellectual breakthroughs
by having epochal thoughts about political philosophy. It is much more
likely that legal scholarship would flourish if law professors were prepared
to go beyond case analysis (and the worst sort of third-rate evolutionary
history) and start to think about the legal problems of property or contract
or crime. It is not impossible to give serious thought to legal issues and
to go beyond mere analogy and distinguishing. Instead of dwelling upon
decisionism, dialogism, and objectivism, it might be a good idea for legal
scholars to remember that their semi-discipline is LAW. If they want
to write in the abstract about liberalism, literary criticism, or whatever,
will they please change departments? We do not need second-rate and
second-hand notions about literary criticism or political theory. There
aregood studies on legal theory relating to legal problems. I would suggest
as an example George Fletcher's Rethinking CriminalLaw, which makes
good use of history, philosophy and, surprise, legal theory.
The first thing that should be done for legal scholarship would be
the abolition of at least three-quarters of the law reviews. The remaining
quarter should only be allowed to survive if they agree to be properly
refereed so that the articles will have some intellectual respectability.
Law reviews are the largest vanity press in existence. It would also help
if the editors were given the petty cash to buy a gross of bluepencils
so that the articles were shortened by at least fifty percent and the footnotes
by seventy-five percent. There is no discipline in legal writing. No other
scholarly pursuit I know of would abide those gasbag 100 page efforts
by young legal academics who allegedly write articles but are really
preparing book reports on works by anthropologists, political scientists,
social theorists, lit crit types, or philosophers. (It is remarkable how
infrequently they refer to historians.) They seem to be reinventing the
intellectual wheel. Perhaps the young academics cannot be blamed for
their prolixity because they have been very badly trained. What were
they taught when they were 'brilliant' law students? They prepared good
summaries so that they could get As on 100 percent examinations. When
they were editors of the law review, they nitpicked their way through
7000 footnotes and they were experts on style and uniform citations.
What they did not learn was synthesis. One wonders why. Is it the state
of teaching? Do law professors simply mouth off and infrequently show
a toughness of mind that would encourage rigorous thinking? Perhaps
this is a sign of the nature of legal culture. Most of it is lore rather
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than law. The culture encourages teachers to train the students for jury
addresses rather than the kind of discussion one would hope to find
in a faculty seminar. Is the answer that the law is essentially antiintellectual? Can we only talk about the philosophy of law in an Arts
department or in an optional law school seminar class populated by seven
students?
The profligacy of so-called legal scholarship should not be overemphasized, but it is time for the law schools to re-examine their present
institutions. If the law professors want to be scholarly, they should start
at home, and in that environment, they might make some progress in
their intellectual development. It will not happen if they decide to lead
an even more schizoid life than at present. It is relatively easy to talk
philosophically about the law when one isolates it from the exigencies
of everyday subjects such as civil procedure or the law of property. Law
professors must become scholarly in their own discipline, which does
not necessarily mean they must be insular. It means that they must try
to make sense out of their own discipline, teach the students to synthesize
and not write excessively prolix articles that simply tack on extra-legal
materials.
I noticed that the symposiasts made somewhat derogatory (or at
least patronizing) remarks about the work of the law reform commissions.
A good study is yet to be done on the work of provincial and federal
law reform commissions. They have carried out different roles. The
provincial bodies have been preoccupied with black letter law, doing
housekeeping to make the lawyers' task a little easier. There has been
very little of the scholarly nature in the work of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission, although I would suggest that the Sunday Observance study
and the Privacy studies were hardly black letter and took a broad historical,
ethical, and psychological approach to those problems.
If we want to do interdisciplinary research, it would be a good idea
to investigate the person years of academic labour that have been put
into paid work for law reform commission work during the last twenty
years. We could examine the type of research that was done; what control
or input the academics had on the subjects to be 'reformed' or the direction
that the research took; to what extent was the research dictated by political
fiat and expediency; what criteria governed selection of researchers; did
the researchers have a free hand to map their research strategies? Such
a study would be an instructive lesson in political theory.
If we now turn to the federal law reform commission, it is surely
very near-sighted to suggest that the work of the Canadian Law Reform
Commission is not a scholarly enterprise. I cannot speak of the Commission's work on criminal procedure or administrative law but I do
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know something about the criminal law programme and the euthanasia
and meaning-of-death studies. Law teachers who lament the state of
scholarship should read Our CriminalLaw because it is one of the finest
pieces of legal writing on criminal law. Its greatest merit is that it is
a very good piece of synthesis.
I may be a very poor example of the new 'scholarly' academic lawyer,
but I cannot imagine what else could be said after reading Our Criminal
Law. What would a reputable criminologist say? Would he talk about
Marxist theories of law withering away and criminal law being a capitalist
tool to persecute the proletariat? The document Our CriminalLaw throws
down a challenge to those of you who want to produce scholarly research.
What would you say about your particular area of law and how would
you say it any more economically and eloquently than the authors of
Our Criminal Law? What political theory would you inject into this
formulation to make it more 'scholarly'? You may say, yes, it is a good
description of the legal thought relating to criminal law but it is so vague.
Where, you protest, is the application of such philosophy to the practical
problems of criminal law? The answer is found in Our Criminal Law:
The GeneralPart.In that report of the L.R.C.C. you will find a rational
description of the criminal law and the theory behind the system of criminal
justice.
Finally, the whole question of a 'scholarly' approach to the law
is dependent on the need to protect Canadian legal culture. I do not
want to adopt the mantle of Robin Matthews but someone has to make
a protest (or at least a statement) about the lack of Canadian content
in the discussion of legal scholarship. I find it very sad that young scholars
in Canada are so insensitive to the local cultural scene that they are
prepared to embrace any ideas that are spawned in Cambridge, Mass.
without giving much thought to their application to the Canadian situation.
This idolatry of the U.S. Legal God is a mindless one and it takes little
account of the Canadian society and of Canadian history. Instead, those
Canadian scholars who want to be so scholarly are spending all their
time examining the entrails of a U.S. constitutional goat. Isn't it a little
strange that these well-educated Canadians want to spend all their time
worshipping the U.S. Constitution or at least the oracles found mostly
on the Eastern Seaboard of the U.S. who can divine the meaning of
the eighth or the fourteenth amendments? Have those Canadian scholars
who are interested in the Charter of Rights given any thought to the
peculiarly Canadian aspects of our legal culture? Do they know anything
about the way in which Canadian legal culture developed? Is it culturally
real to talk about a U.S. constitutional document when one is addressing
the descendents of the Loyalists, the Red Tories of Ontario, or the peculiar
experience of the Western provinces?

